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THE LAWS OF AIR WARFARE: ARE THERE ANY? 
Hamilton DeSaussure 
Adivit V Illls inereased within tIll: 
United N-ations reeently to reexamine 
the laws of war and to update them to 
med the modern conditions of armed 
conflict. In a resolution adopted unani-
lIlously on L3 January 1969, U.N. Reso-
lution 2444, the General Assembly 
~,mphasized the necessity for applying 
basic humanitarian principles to all 
armcd conflicts. It furthcr affirmed 
thrcc principles laid down by thc Inter-
national Committee of the Red Cross at 
their Vienna conference in 1965. First, 
that the rights of the parties to a 
conflict to adopt means of injuring the 
enemy arc not unlimited; second, that 
the launching of attacks against the 
l'ivilian populations a,~ ,~IlC" is pro-
hibited; and third, that "A dislindion 
lIlust be made bet ween person~ laking 
part in hostilities and Ihe eivilian popu-
lation with the view of sparing the laLLer 
a~ mueh as lIOR<;ible.,,1 The 1I.N. (~l'n­
eral Assembly Resolution then invited 
the Secretary General, in consultation 
with Ihe International Committee of the 
Red Cro5..<;, (leRe) 10 sludy how 10 
beLLer apply the existing laws of war for 
"the bctter protection of civilians, 
prisoners and combatants and for the 
further limitation on certain methods 
and means of warfare." All states were 
asked to ratify the Hague Laws of War 
ConventiOlis of 1899 and 1907, the 
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, and the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949. Pursuant 
to that resolution, the Secretary General 
circulated for comment, among member 
states and international organizations, a 
report enlitled "Respect for Human 
Righ Is in A nm~d Con niets."2 II is CI~port 
eonlains a historieal survey of 1111: l:xisl-
ing international agreements pertaining 
to the laws of war, urging those states 
whieh hav(~ appended reservations Lo 
wiLIHlraw Lll!:m. The SecreLary General 
reqll("~t(:tI thaL "sp,'cial elllphasi~ be 
plat'(,d on the dissemination of tht' 
eonv(mLions Lo miliLary p,:rsonnd at all 
"wI,ls of 'IIIthority, and on th(' instn\('-
Lions of sueh pl'rsons as 10 tilt: pri'H'il'l,:s 
of till: Convl!ntion and on their applica-
tion." TIll' obsl:rvation wns madl~ thnt 
both juridical and military expl!rLs are 
1\('I:dl:<I to sLudy this subjeeL "~o as to 
m:hiev(!, undl'r tlIC: eondiLions of JIII)(lerll 
warfar('. an ",11:qualt' ('OJnprd\('n~ion of 
LIII' "full rang.: of tet'hnieal anel Il'gal 
problems. " 
'I'll!: Seert'lary r: eneral makes no 
sp('cifh: plea for a convention regulating 
nir warf,tn:, but he does seem to indiel 
"mas~iv(: air IJOmbing" by noting: Ihat, 
in sonl(! eases, Lhis Lype of warfare has 
contribuLed to a very broad inll:rpn:ta~ 
tion of wh~t \ constitutes a permissible 
miliLary obj('dive. lIe staLes LhaL stra-
tegic bombing has, in insLances, been 
lI~ed for intimidating, demoralir.ing, nnd 
tl:rrorh~in/!; l'ivilians "by in nieting: in-
diseriminatl' tll'struetion u(lon d,'nsl'ly 
poplllatt,d an'as." In IIII' n'plil's to thl' 
r!'fHlrl, only Finland has ;I'l,t'ifil'ally 
,ulVl'rll'd 10 tht' nl'l'd for a ('odifit'alilln 
of the law~ of air warfare. 
'J'hi~ re~olution was the resulL of a 
IINESCO-(:oll\'I:lwd Confl:n'nel! on 
IIlImall l{j{!ht~ ill 'I'd,,:rall ill April of 
I%B.3 Then:, He~oluLion XXIII was 
,1I)opll'd by till: Conferen(!(: with only 
on(' ahslenLion and no votes against it. 
(Ht:fI:rn:tI to bdow as the 'J'I,lternn 
))(:daraLion.) IL was couched in stronger 
tl:rms than later used in U.N. H(!solulion 
244'~, rderrinp; Lo LII!: widespread vio-
h'll(:l: and brutaliLy of our time~, in-
dueling "massat'n:s, sumnwry 1''\ ('eu-
tions, lorlun's, inhuman In'atml'nt of 
prisOIlI'rs, killing of l'i\'ilians in anIH'l1 
(!onflil'ls anel the Us(: of dll:mieal and 
biologit'al nwans of wnrfnre indueling 
napalm bombing." 
\\,ilh IIII' ha('J..gw\II1I1 of II.N. i{l'slllu-
tion ;l·I·I·I· anti tIll' T .. lwran i>l't'laration, 
II\(' ICRC tleeitletl to expand ils seope of 
281 
sLudies Lo incluelt' consideration of the 
laws of war as thcy apply to thc 
regulation of the eonducL of hosLilities. 
A ('omll1iUee of experLs of the 1CRC 
convened in February 19(>9 and formu-
lated a n'port entitled "ReaffirmaLion 
and D,:vdopment of the Laws :\IId 
Customs Applicable in Armed Con-
f1it:ls.,>4 It was the cuhninaLion of Lheir 
observations made during the lasL 20 
years of p(!rennial armco conflicts, es-
p,!t:ially in Korea, the Middle East, and 
\'il'lnam :In" the Y 1'1I1l'1I. As a reslllL of 
this, the Hed Cross believed it necessary 
to eon sider the means of combat and 
LI\I: relation beLween combaLants Lhcm-
selves. 
The inereaseo emphasis givcn to the 
rl'l!ulalion of armed conllit:! by [he 
lCRC and the U.N. General Assembly 
makes iL all the more necessary for air 
plalllH:rs and flyers to know lheir rights 
and dULies under the laws of war. 
Tlu:re is no dearLh of opinion Lhal in 
the maLLer of air warfare there are, in 
faeL, no posiLive rules, Air Marshal 
Harris, tht: famolls chief of the British 
BomIH'r Command in \V mid \V ar II, 
\Holl' ~horlly aftt'r ill' ('OIlt'III::ion Ihat 
"In thl' malil'l' of Ihl' 11::(' of ain:raft ill 
war, there is, iL so happens, 110 interna-
tional law at all."5 This ,·iew has hcen 
('I'ItOI:" in ilIon: rel:I:llt limes hy wdl-
known illlcl'llation:ll lawy,:rs who h:lve 
speeialir.e" in studies on tIll! laws of war. 
U) n no s(!nse hut a rhetorical one," 
wrote Professor Stone in 1955, "can 
there still be said to have emerged a 
body of inLelligible rules of air warfarc 
eomparahle Lo the traditional rules of 
land and sea warfare.,,6 Professor Levie 
laheled the lIonexistence of a code 
l!lwl'rIIing tIll' lise of airpowl'r in .. rmed 
l'oltllil'l onl' of thl' major inadl'qnaeil's 
in Ih(' l'xisting laWl; of war.7 Whill' the 
view of Air I\larshal Harris refleeLs a 
eerLain hopele::s aLtitnde toward any 
alll'lII(1t 10 n:l!lIlal(' IIti:; imporlant forlll 
of warfare, the views of I'rofe:;:;or:; 
Ston(: and ).('vie eontain (Ileal' 10 foens 
I'('fort on its n'gulalion and darifieation. 
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TllI're are ollly two proVIsions of 
existillg international legi~lation which 
wen~ draft~:d with the regulation of air 
warfan~ specifically ill milld. One was 
the J 1)07 Hague Declaration prohibiting 
the dischargl: of projectiles and explo-
sives from balloons "or by other new 
methods of a similar nature." I twas 
lI(:VI~r ratified by major powcrs. With the 
introduction of the aircraft into World 
War I, with its capacity for guided 
f1i/!ht, the declaration became an open 
nullity. 
The other provision of convl'ntional 
law specific'llly framed to regulate air 
warfare is article 25 of the L 1)07 Hague 
Convention respecting the laws anrl cus-
toms of war on land (H.C. IV). That-
article provided that "The allaek of 
bombardment, by whatever mean,~, of 
towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings 
which arc undefende,D is prohibited." 
The negotiating record t<hows that the 
words "by whatever means" were in-
serted specifically to regulate bombing 
allacks by air. It has been frequently 
referred to a~ a basis for seeking to limit 
the air operalion:; of LH"lIil!c'f!'nt:; and for 
protestillg Ilw dc~darl'd illc'l!al air ac-
tivily of an l'nemy. However, IIIl1lc'-
Cc~nded cities, in the hislorie senSI~, 
meant only those in Ihe immediak YoOlW 
of ground operalioll:; whieh I:ollid IIf" 
t<l'ized and ol"('upic'd by adv;lIl1:illg 
groulld Coree:; without the USI: of Coree. 
In this 8en8e tlte concept oC the unde-
fended locality has proven as empty in 
air combat as thc balloon declaration. 
These two provisions so ullcrly igllored 
in the usc of airpowcr by belligerents 
arc the total sum oC formal rules agreed 
to by any stales on Ihe conduct of 
Itostilitic's from the air;:paee. 
One official and ambitious alll'mpt 
was mL\{h~ 10 completdy codify the laws 
oC air warfare after World War I. At the 
Wa"hillgton ConCI'r!'I\('l' Oil the I.imila-
tion of :\"'II;\mc'lIl" ill I II~ I. a rc':,olulioll 
wa" \Il1allimou:,ly :1\,pr,)\, .. 11 h~ 11\l' 
Ullilc,lI ~Iall':;. Ihl' Ulliled Killgdlim, 
I·'ralll'e. Ilaly, ;uIII Japan whieh ('alll'd 
for a eommlSSIOl1 of juri:;l:; 10 C:Ollve'lll: 
at The Ilaglw to study the: SII hjl:cl. Legal 
experts Crolll tltmw eonlltries :mel the 
Netherland:; met thl're from December 
11)22 to February 11)2:1 and framed an 
all-emhraeing eodification of the suhjecL 
intended to he a eompromisl! hetween 
the necessities of war and the requirc-
mcnts of the standards of civili1.ation.8 
Their rules were never ratified, even by 
the parties to the Conferenee, hilL do 
rdb:t the only allthoritative: altl!mptto 
l"et down completely the air warfare: 
rules. Prior to World War II, certain 
lIatiolls did indicate Iheir intlmt to 
adhere to these rilles, notably .J apan in 
I na in their China campai~n, but they 
had lillie illflul~nce in World War II. 
This paucity of conventional rules 
has -left airmen stranded Cor authorita-
tive alld practical guidanee: It is true the 
airman is subject to the general laws of 
war to thc same general extent as lhe 
sailor and the soldier, but where dOl:s he 
look for special rules governing his air 
aelivity'? The British illanllal of Air 
Vorce' Law dispI'lIsed with allY dCort to 
. formulaIC' air warCan' rull':; hy slalillg in 
a footlloll! thaI. ill tlte' ah:'I'III'C' of 
gf'lIeral :lgn'I'lIl1'nt, it wa:; il\lpos:;ihll~ to 
illdlldc: ill thaL manllal .1 dlapkr 011 air 
warfan:. 9 The alllhoritativl! U.S. Army 
Fit'lt/ MIIIIIIIII (Fill 27-(0) 1111 TIIC' Law 
of Lalld Warfare, aparl frolll rcofe'\'('II(~I'S 
eOlltained in till: (;elll:va COIIVI:ntioIlS of 
II)·~I) respecting the status of ain'rews as 
prisollcrs of war and medical ail'craft, 
only refers to air activities in time of 
armcd conflict in four instanccs. What a 
l"kimpy source of guidance for the in-
quiring airmail when one notes ll\l! 
extcnsive scope of intcnded !ruidanee oC 
Ihe draft Hague Rules oC 11)~:l wl1l'n~ 
:;lIdl subjC'd:; a:; the markillg of ain'raft, 
aerial bombardment, the lI:;e of illl~l'n­
diary alld explosive bullets WI'W l:OV-
en,d. Toda\"':; U.S, Air Forel' l'rC'Wnl:1II 
abolll 10 c';llc'r a c'ombal IllI'all'l' is :;liIl 
n'fC'lTC'l1 offic'ialh- 10 Ih,' I rill \' Fie'leI 
.1/11 1/1111 [ for offil'i;11 ill:'lrlll"lioll. ' 
'1'111' U.~. Air For .. l· did IIl1dl'I'lake~ tl\l! 
task of drafting guidance on thc subject 
of air warfarc in 1956. After 4 years of 
rescarch, a draft manual on thc suhject 
was finalizcd. However, the decision to 
release it for publication has never been 
made. The draft Air Force maimal has 
bcen made available to the students of 
the Air Force Academy and the Air War 
College for research and discussion pur-
poses. Because of its unofficial nature, 
howevcr, it has not been availahle to 
aircrews and air planners. Its influence 
even within the U.S. Air Force is rda-
tively slight. 
Three dilemmas confront the regula-
tion of air hostilities. The Air Force 
draft, no morc than the Hague Rulcs of 
1923, can not fully lay down tlw 
existing rulcs of air combat without a 
ccrtain concordancc among the major 
air powers..!!!ld among belligcrents as to 
how thcse.~ilemmasl should be resolved. 
The first of these dilemmas is the 
permissible scope of the military objec-
tive. Inherent in this problem is whether 
in air warfare there is any realistic 
distinction to be made between com-
batants and noncombatants. Also, is 
there a middle category, the so-called 
quasi-combatant (L1u: industrial work 
force of the enemy) within the military 
objeetiv(!'? U.N. Resolution 24t14 5tatl~cI 
tl\(: dvilian population should 1101 1m 
the objl:et of allat:k as .~llch. Are I:i\·ili-
ans the direct obj(!el of <ILLa(:k when 
vital industrial and strategic targ<:ts are 
in. the immcdiate vicinity, and how 
much bombing transfers civilians from 
the indirect-object category to a direct-
object one'? The lal<: Professor Coopl:r, 
in a lecture to the Naval \V ar Colle~c in 
1948, tcrmed the definition of the 
military objectivc and the bombing of 
the civilian population the most erueial 
issue confronting auy attempt to reg~J­
late this subject. The Sel'relary (;elll'ral 
docs recomml'llIl an alternative to arriv-
ing at an al'I'I'ptahl!' :11\(1 a~n"',I-upol\ 
ddinition of thl! milit:lry objl'l,tiw. 10 
This would bl! :111 enlargemeut of the 
concept of safety or protected zones to 
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include specified areas where womcn, 
children, elderly, and sick could be 
loeatcd with immullity from air attack. 
Sueh areas would contain no objectives 
of military significance nor be used for 
any military purpose. Thcy would have 
to be spceially and clearly marked to be 
visible from the air. To be effective 
there would have to be an adequate 
system of control and verjfication of 
these zones. This verification would be 
carried out either by some independent 
agency, such as the ICRC, or by one or 
more nonbelligerent nations acting in 
the capacity of a proteeting power. 
There is ample preeedent for tl\(: en:a-
tion of such protected areas in the 1949 
C elleva H ulllan itarian ism Conven Lions 
for the protel'lion and lrt:almcnt of 
prisoners of war, civilians, and the sick 
and wounded. The Sick and Wounded 
and the Civilian Conventions contain as 
annexes, draft agreements hopefully to 
be signed by potential belligerents be-
fore the outbreak of hostilities. I 1 These 
agreements would provide for the estab-
lishment of hospital and safety zones. 
Such zones, under the (~eneva Conven-
Lions, are Lo eomprise olily a small part 
of the bdligenmL's terri Lory , l)(: Lhinly 
populaled, and be rcmoved and free 
frolll all military objectives or large 
illllw;(rial 01' :ululinistralivl' I'slahlish-
nll:nt5. 'I'III'Y lIIay not be ddl~IIII(,11 hy 
mililary means (whieh presumably in-
dudes the dcfcnsl: by antiairerafL weur-
ons, lactical fighter aircraft, or guided 
weapons). Such a conccpt of protccted 
zoncs, but incorporating a brouder catc-
gory of til<: c.ivili:1II population lo he 
!'III'lll'n:d, is an a\tI'rnatiVI: 10 1111' eon-
cept of the undefended town or the 
opcn city which has 1I0t found favor in 
aclual practice. Therc arc some who do 
1I0t bcliev(! thc eslablishmcnt of safely 
zoncs for polenlially large !'l'p;mellts of 
lhl' l'ivilian population is pradieabll'. To 
lH' "ITI'din' it is thou~lrt thl'N' ZOIIl'S 
would require 11lllusatll!s of square milt,s 
whieh would l'n'ute insurmountable 
logistics problems and incvitably cause 
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the areas to he used unlawfully for 
military advantages. 1 2 
Perhaps, however, the immuni;r.ed 
areas'need not be so broad. If one grants 
that the industrial work foree, those 
actively engagcd in work directly sus-
taining the war effort of the belligerent, 
really have no entitlement to immunity, 
the physical breadth of the protected 
areas could be reduced. Such zones arc 
an alternative to the continually frus-
trating efforts to pin down the elusive 
scope of the military objective. The 
Hague Commission of Jurists' definition 
of the military objective is a case in 
point. Military forces; military works; 
military establishments or depots; fac-
tories engaged in the manu facture of 
arms, ammunition, or disLinctively mili-
tary supplies; lines of communication or 
transportation used for military pur-
poses, only, could be bombed from the 
air. 13 This was hardly broad enough to 
cover the enemy's marshaling ya'rds, his 
indusLrial centers, his shipping facilities, 
and his means of communieaLion. More-
over, cities, towns, and villages noL in 
the immediate neighborhood of ground 
operation were prohibited under the 
Hague Rules. This proved too limited 
where cities and towns, far remove,1 
from the ground action, were known Lo 
b,: viLal Lo the enemy's war dfol'l. 
The LoLaliLy of World War II saw 
both the Allies and the Axis expand 
considerably on the miliLary objeeLivc. 
The German LufLwaffe virLually de-
stroyed Warsaw, Rotterdam, and Coven-
try by air very early after the opening of 
hostilities. The first thousand-bomber 
raid launched by the British on Cologne 
the night of 30 May 1942 destroyed 12 
percent of the city's industrial and 
residential sections and caused 5,000 
casualties. It set the tone for the whole 
British night-bomber offensive against 
the Third Hl'ieh; the eoncel't that an~a 
bombing of important indu~lrial el'nll'r~ 
wa$ be$t $uill'd to bring (;ermany to her 
knees. 
U.S. forces, with their superior navi-
gational aids, did seek to confine thdr 
targets to individually scleet(:d and id,:n-
tified factories, oil refineries, industrial 
plants, and shipyards iu Europe. How-
ever, in the Far East, Tokyo and Yoko-
hama wcre saturated with explosive and 
fire bombs because of the so-called 
J apancsc shadow industries; that is, the 
production of war parts in the individ-
ual home. The first night air raid by 
U.S. superfortresses in the Far East 
occurred on 9 March 1945 over Tokyo, 
and it is reported that 280 of these 
bombers destroyed several s~uan: miles 
of the center of the city. 4 In the 
Korean conflict, precision bombing was 
again emphasized by the Air Forces 
(mostly U.S.) of the U.N. Command. 
The repair shipg, doekyanb, and mili-
tary warehouses of North Korea were 
bombed without significant damage to 
surrounding cities. In the Vietnamese 
conflict, however, area of saturation 
bombing has been reintroduced, this 
time to penetrate the vast jungle canopy 
which serves as a prot{:ctive layer for the 
network of Vietcong and North Vietna-
mcse storage areas, communil~ution and 
tran~portation complexes, und ('0 1Il-
Illund POgts. 
The ehurters for the triul of major 
war crirnin;lls for Europe, mul for till: 
Far East, ddin(~ the wanton d,~gtl'lll'tioll 
of (:itieg, tOWill', or villageg or d(~vasta­
tion not justified by military nceessity 
as a war crime. Inhumane acts eOIll-
mitted against the civilian population 
arc defined as a crime against Im-
manity.15 Several high German Air 
Force officers were indicted for war 
crimes, notably Field Marshal Goring, 
and Generals Milch and Speidel. How-
ever, none were tried for their part in air 
operations. It has been argued indis-
criminate air attacks were not charged 
.. gainst Axis leaders because bolh sides 
parlieipated equally in :'>lI('h alla<:ks. 
Ilml'\'\'I'r, otlll'r allth()riti('~ I'laillll'clihat 
till' l'\'idl'nec gallll'red elid nol ~uhgtan­
tiate a charge of w<lnlon dl':>lruetion in 
air attacks. In perhaps the only dis-
(:us~il)n of ~tral<:gic air bomhardment hy, 
a war (:rinu:s tribunal ill Europe:, a U.S. 
military trillUnal stale:d "A eity is 
homlu:d for taclical purposcs; communi-
cati,ons arc lo bl: dc~lroyecl, railroads 
wreekcd, ammunition plants de-
molit'hed, faeluries ra1.ed, all for the 
purpose: of impeding the military. In 
lh($e' ope'rations it illl'vitahly Iwppens 
thal nonmilitary per~ollS are killed. ,,16 
Ranking German offieers sueh as Field 
Marslml I\e'ssdring testified at NUrI:m-
hcrg that Warsaw, ROlle:rdam, and other 
cilie$ hOll1lwd by the Luftwaffe in the: 
early sLagel' of the war all conLained 
miliLary objc:eLivcs. 
Tlw JCRC has drawn a distin<:tion 
lu!twI:I!Il oeeupalion or tactieal bom-
ImrdnH:nts aIHI sLraLe~i(' one!s. In Lhe 
fornu:r ('aLegory an: Lhmw air raids 
c10sdy allil:d Lo ground fighLing. The: 
experLs suggested the institu lioJl of 
OJII:II localities for the protection of 
civilians. In slratcgic bombardments the 
eXIH!rls bdic:ved the military objl!cLive! 
must 1m sufficiently ide:nlified hy till! 
aLLacking foree! aIHI that any lo~ \0 
civilian lif(, musL be proporLiona[e Lo 
til(: military advan[;l~l: Lo til: SC:Cllfl,d. 
WIII'IJe\'e'r [Iu: prim!ipll: of propor[ ion-
aliLY mi~hl til: violall:d, LIII' (;omha[an[ 
should rc.fl'ain from [III' allal'k. Thl' 
1"'111'r[s fail, how('\'l'r, [0 adl'lJllall'ly 
ddill(' what constiLutes a miliLary objec-
tive just as did the Hague Con{missioll 
of .I IIri~lg. ] t is manifest tlu:y do nol 
endori'c! strall!p:ie arc:a hO.ITILill~. They 
cile the propo~ilion L1mL Lo "aLL:lI:k 
withouL dis[iIH!Lion, as a ~ingle Objl!l'-
Live, ,111 ama indlleling sevl'rnl miliLary 
ohjl:elives aL a disLance from OI1l' an-
other is forbidden whenever demenLs of 
the ('ivililln popnlnLion or dwellings. arc' 
~itual!!d in belween.,,1 8 While neither 
the Red Cross nor the Sl:erelnry Ge'ncrnl 
('onclotl(' area' bombin/!, hdligerents an: 
no\ like,ly [0 forego a \'aluahl<' s[ralc'/!i(' 
op[ion for air allm'ks whi..ll has pro\'e'c! 
so helpful in t'l'l'uring a more r,l\'orable 
mill quicker ll'rminalion of the conllic:L. 
Like [he philosophy of defining the 
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mililary ohjeclive e:xchll;iv<;:ly, formula-
tions which leave the: military int:apahle 
of accomplishing its assignments are 
likely to be ignored, hcncc the dilcmma 
he!twt:e!n the: ,!xpression of hopes of 
expe:rts i1nd the actuul pruc:tiel!s of 
bdligen:nL". 
Tlwr(' doe$ SI!C:1lI to Ill: ground for 
('olllpromisc:. COJl{!e!c1ing thilt thousand~ 
of ~quarc: mi\e~ could not he! (:udosed 
within safety y.one:s, an extension of the 
hospital zoncs formulatcd in the Gencva 
Humanitarian Conventions of 1949 
seellls both dt:sirable und f ea::;ibl(:. More-
over, the ]-Iague Convcntion for the 
Protcction of Cultural Propcrty providcs 
another logical cxtcnsion.19 This con-
vl!ntion is the product of an intergovern-
mental con ferc:nt:e: eonvell(:d ut The 
llnglle: in J 95,t (The Unilt:d States has 
not yct ratified, hut 57 states have 
be!come parties.) Whereas the Gcneva 
Conventions of 1949 urc for the protec-
tion of persons, the 1954 Hague Con-
vention.pn:scrves cultural JlJ'Opc:rty. It is 
of special significllrll:c to airmcn for 
~e!vcral reasons. First, it ('quates "Iargc 
indu~trial ee'nll'rs" to "militarv ouie'e-
tivt:s" hy provicling that plitec:s l;r refug(! 
for llIov~II.Ic' eul!urill prope'r[y nlllst Ill: 
ph1l:ed a[ an adequate! distmH:e' froUl 
('it her. Se('olHI, i[ hroileJ.:ns [111' e'0I1I:I:pt 
of [Ill' mili[ilr)' objl'('[iv('s by I'J'Ovieling 
ll",t Lhis term include!, b.,' way of 
example, airports, uroadeasting stations, 
e!stahlishlllcnts I!nl!;agcd upon work of 
national ddenSl!, ports, railway stntions 
of relative importunec, and main line~ of 
I!OUlmuniealion. Third, it reeogniy.es 
tl",[ thl! prineiple of impl!ralive military 
neel'~ity deprives cultural property of 
its protection, ilnd finally. that in no 
l'\'('nt shall SUdl l'ulLural property he thc 
suhject of reprisal raids. 
A\I of lhesc Uri! important realistic 
principles fully ilpplieilble to llir eOll1bilL. 
TI1C' U~(' of phll!('s of refug(', ('h'arly 
marked and id('n[ifil'el, for [Ill' proll'(!· 
tion of cultural pJ'Operty l!oulcl 1ll' till: 
0pl'ninl!; for enlarging the categories of 
ohjeets and huildings to he immtlni1.ed. 
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In the same way the extension of 
hospital zoncs is the start for increm;ing 
till! areas for the proledion of civilians. 
Cerlainly the ,:nlargemf:nt of safdy 
zones for property and people is com-
patible with area as well as precision 
bombing techniqucs. Neither concepl 
requires the destruction of identified 
protected areas placed at an adequate 
distanee from large industrial eenters 
and I:ssential military targets. This is not 
to suggest that all faeililies and cate-
gories of the civilian population outside 
proteeLed areas would bc within the 
domain of legitimate air aLLaek. They 
would not enjoy, however, the same 
absolute immunily conferred within thc 
immunized ZOIlf'S. Although not subjeet 
to direet aLLaek outsidc established sane-
tuaries, their proximity to assigned mili-
tary targets would expose them to 
injury and sllfrering whieh could not 
thereby be aseribed as indiscriminate or 
UJan/on. Thc doctrine of proportionalily 
would, of Gourse, dictate in any I:vcnt 
that the military advantage to be gaincd 
by the air aLLack must not be out-
weighed by the harlll done to civilians 
and nonessential property. However, 
this doctrine itself seelllS lo leave a wiele 
margin for the discretion of the aLLack-
ing force. 
The second dilelllma inhibitin~ the 
development of the laws of air warfan: 
centers around the dlOiee of weapons 
which lIIay he employed. The historic 
St. Petersburg Dedaration of I B(,B 
which prohibited the usc of explosive, 
fulminating, or inflammable substances 
in bullets has no application to air 
warfare.2o Their usc bv aircraft is for 
the purpose of destroying the enemy's 
aircraft and resources and not primarily 
for the purpose of injuring enemy per-
sonnel. ~'or the same reason, the old 
Hague /)edaration of I 899, prohibilin~ 
the usc of expanding builds, has not 
bl'('n I'Xt!'llflt-d to ;Iir (llll'rations. TllI'n' 
an:, howl'\'('r, thn'(~ general arl'as whl'rl' 
till: type of weapon emploYl'd has 
evok(~d . particular eonlroversy wilh 
respeeLto aircraft. 
I"irst is the use of atomic weapons. 
There is substantial legal opinion that 
such weapons arc unlawful. This view 
has bel~n rdlected by U.N. Resolution 
I (,!):3 (X VI) which specifically provi(h,d 
that "Any state using nuclear and 
thermo nuclear weapons is to be con-
siden:d as violating the Charter of the 
United Nations, acting contrary to the 
laws of humanity and as comllliLling a 
crime against mankind and civilil,ation." 
The Secretary General notes, howevcr, 
that the legal effect of this resolution is 
suhjeet to question because of the 
divided vole, 55 for, 20 against, mul 26 
abstentions. The lCRC experts were 
divided Oil how hest to handll! the 
question of nuclear usc. They were 
unanimous that sueh weapons were in-
compatihle with the expressed aim of 
the Haguc Conventions to reduce un-
necessary su ffering. The present U.S. 
view as expressed in the U.S. Army 
Field Manllal on the laws of war is clear. 
I t provides that the use of sud. weapons 
dol'S nol vio\;llt: illternatioll:Jllaw in the 
absellee of any customary mil: or inter-
lIatioual (:onvell tiOIl. 2 1 The (tl:d Cniss 
also gaVI! taeil recognition lo this vil!w-
point at Vienlla in 1965 by providing 
thal the "C 1~lIeral prilleipll:s of tlw laws 
of war ~g~ly to nuclear and similar 
weapons. 
The seeond general an:a arousing 
controversy relates to the USI: of fire 
weapons and specifically napalm. Again 
the official U.S. position as reflected in 
the U.S. Army Field Jl:lallllal is tlml their 
employment against targets requiring 
their lise is not in violation of in terna-
tional law. with the caveat that they arc 
not to be used in a way to cause 
unnecessary suffering to individuals.23 
This view is in opposition to the Tehe-
ran Itt'solution of May 11}(.11 whidl 
("pITs,;ly ('Olldl'IIII1I,d Il<ll'alm hOIll hillg. 
~llllle ICBC experts vil'w!'d tht: ut'(' of 
ill!'eluliaries as prohibitl',1 by tlw Gelleva 
Protol:ol of ] 925 becausc of its as-
phyxiuting I:ffects while others con-
sidercd it was thc lLse to which inccn-
diarics were put which dl:tcrmincd its 
lawfulness. U.N. Resolution 2444 docs 
not spccifically condemn the IISI: of 
inclmcliuries, indllding nupulm, hut till: 
Seerl'lary GI'Illmti StUtl$ till: reglliation 
of inflmnmuhle suhstunces c1curly 11I:cds 
an agrecmcnL. Certainly, thc cxtensivc 
resort to incendiarics in World War If, 
Koreu, and in Vietnam has demon-
strull:d the military efficuey of this 
wl:llpon. It is rc:usonubll: to ('ondulk 
thut only by special intcrnutionul ugrc'e-
ment will tlH'ir USI: evcr bl: n:strictcd, 
controlled, or ubolished. 
The third area of gmu:ralunccrtainty 
rdatl:!; to thc lise of weupons caleulated 
to affect thc enmny through his senscs 
(including hi~ skin), thc usc of chemical 
and bacteriological weapons. Included 
in this cutegory arc thc usc of non-
injuriol1s agents, such as tear gas, und 
also the usc of herbicidcs and defoliants. 
All of thl:se possible means of warfare 
centl'r around thl: (;eneva Gas Protoeol 
of IIJ:!!) mill its preeisl' cornl,.l!':;.24 Th(' 
Proto(!ol prohibits in wur till! (l!'I! of 
usphyxiating, poisonous, or othl'\" ga:;I::; 
und all analogo(ls liquids, materials, or 
dl:vi('.l's and, further, the USI: of haeterio-
IOl!il'al rnc:lhods of warfan:. l\lon: than 
(,5 stUtl:S an: formally bound by this 
agrel:rncnL. In 19(,(i thl: U.N. Generul 
Assmnbly passcd a resolll tion by 91 in 
fuvor, none against, and four abstcn-
tions that called for the striet obser-
vanCI: of the Protocol by ull stutes und 
asking those meml)(:rs who had not 
done so to ratify it.2 5 No one is against 
this Protocol, bllt its correct interpreta-
tion finds nations in disagreemcnt. 
Sornc bclieve the IISC of ineendiuries und 
nupullll an: prohibitl:d uncler the Proto-
('01, III am' b('lieve thut riot ('ontrol 
agl'nts su·dl ilS tl'ur I!as Illuy not ll(' 
t'lllploYl'd, und there is il stron/! ril'\\, 
thut CVI:n herbicides fall within its pur-
view. 
The U.S. position on these vurious 
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views was stated hy the President and 
thl: Secretury of Statl!. On J9 August 
J970 the Prcsident, in submitting the 
Protocol to the U.S. Scnate, stated that 
"The U.S. has renounced the first use of 
lethal and incupacitating chemical weap-
ons and renounced any lise of biological 
or toxie weapons.,,2 6 The Se(!retary of 
SLate noted the Protocol had becn 
observed in almost all armed conflicts 
since 1925 and that the United States 
understanding was that LIl(! Protocol did 
not prohibit till: USl~ in war of riot 
Gontrol a~I'nll~ and chl'\llieal herbicides. 
Further, that ~Illoke, llanH:, illld napalm 
arc not covered b~ the Protocol's gen-
cral prohibition? This view is not 
ge nerally f:hared. In ,1 resolu tion 
adopted hy till! CI:neral A~~emhly on'l (, 
December J 969, the Asscmhly declared 
that any chemical agenLc; of warfare 
(gaseous, liquid, or solid) employed 
because of their direct toxic effects on 
man, animal or plants-and any biologi-
cal agents of warfare intended to cause 
death in man, animals or plants are 
contrary to the gcncrally recognized 
ruh's of inll'rnational law embodied in 
the CelH!ViI Protoeol of 17 June 
I 92!i.28 This He~oluti()n waf; over-
whelmingly udopted 130 for, only thrce 
against (Australia, Portugal,' alllt Lhe 
lInil<'d Slall:~), alld :U) ahskntions. 
The third dilcmma conecrns Lhe 
stutus of the air<:rcwman. Here is a 
problem of the enforcement of clearly 
dcfined rules raLher thull the devclop-
ment of new onl:s. The fallen airman 
poses problems of growing conccrn as 
he seems to be singled ouL for mistrcat-
ment or unauLhorized public display 
with increasing frequcncy. Both the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 
rc$pccLin/! land warfare contained pro-
vif;ions that memhers of till! armed 
[Of!"I'S were entitled to til' trl'all~d :If; 
pri~onl'r~ of war. Of eOllrs(~. this in-
dudl:d allmelllhl'rs. " I 
Earl\' in World War I there was .. S0l11e 
questio"n as to the enemy air~6~ 's", 
:;tatus, but no euse appeared' in wlll'cll~.: 
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they were denied 'prisoner-of-war status. 
In World War II, however, the concept 
began to be advanced by some that 
airmen, unlike their brothers in arms on 
land and at sea, were not necessarily 
entitled to be humanely treated. In 
1943 Himmler ordered all senior SS and 
police officers not to interfere bctwel!n 
German civilians and English and United 
States flyers who baled out of their 
aircraft. In 1944 Hitler ordered Allied 
airerews shot without trial whenever 
such aircrews had attacked German 
pilots or airerews in distress, allaeked 
railway trains, or strafed individual 
civilians or vehicles. Goebbcls referred 
to Allied airmen as murderers and stated 
it was "hardly possible and tolerahle to 
use German police and soldiers against 
the German people when the people 
treat murdere1s of children as they 
deserve. ,,29 
Although captured Allied airmen 
were largely accord cd prisoner-of-war 
status hy German authorities, there is 
enough evidence of mistreatment in the 
reports of the major and minor war 
criminals in Europe to r('11('et the ll('-
ginnings of what could he a disturhinp: 
precedl!nl. In tlw Far East, Allied air-
men also suffered fro/ll deprivation of 
their prisolwr-of-war statlls. Two of tIll! 
U.S. ain:n:ws wllidl participated ill till' 
famous Doolittle air raids on Tokvo and 
Nagoya from thl! U.S. naval 'earrier 
lIomel WI!re eaptllrcd by J aparll$l: 
troops when they made forced landings 
in mainland China. At the tillle of their 
capture there was no Japanese law 
under which they could be punished. 
This was remedied 4 months after their 
enpture by thc passage of the Enemy 
Airmen's Act of Japan. This act made it 
a war crime to participate in nn air 
attack upon civilians, private property, 
or conduct air operations in violation of 
the laws of war. Thl' law was m.lIll! 
rclroadive to ('ov('r thos\' lI.S. airnll'n 
already in their hands. In October I IH~, 
2 months after the passage of the 
Enemy Airnwllj's Ad, threl! of. the ))00-
lillie- rniders wef/! selltl!need nlld 
executed. The Judgment of the In tern a-
tionnl Tribunal for the Far EnRt reflects 
mnny instnllccs thereafter where cap-
tured Allied nirmen were tortured, de-
eapitnted, nnd eVl!n dl!liberatcly hurned 
to death.30 
The Chartl!rs 0 f till! I ntem utiOlwl 
Military Tribunal (Nuremherg) und 
Tokyo expressly make it a war crime to 
murder or ill treat prisoners of war. 
Both General Keitel of the Germnn 
Arllly (;elll'ral St.lff mid Kaltenhr\lluu:r 
of the Gestapo wen: I!harp;,'d und I:on-
viCl!'d with mistreating POW's, in part, 
it appeurg, for tlwir role in the mistreuL-
mcnt of enptured Allied airmen.31 
However, in the trinl of Japanese 
judges, J apaneRe judicial and prison 
official,; were convicted on a different 
basis. The thruRt of the holdings of the 
War Crimes Commissions in thcse cuscs 
was that the U.S. nirmen were deprived 
of a fair trial and not that U.S. airmen, 
as lawful combatants, were entitlcd to 
POW status. Article 4 of thc 1949 
Geneva COllv('ntion on POW's con-
firmed tlw l'ntith'lIIl'nt of ain'n'w 1II1!11l-
ber,; to the bem'fits of that COII\'I'ntio\l 
as well a,; "l'ivilian 1II1!lIIhl~rS of military 
airerews" und "erl!ws of l:ivil :Iirerafl." 
Arlicll~ B5 provides that prisolwrs of w.lr 
pro~WI:IlIt:" IIl1dl'" tlll~ lawll of IIII' Ih'-
taining )lower for ads l:omlllittcd prior 
to enptllre :;hall n!tain, l!Ven if eon-
vieted, the bCIH:fits of that Convl:ntion. 
Compliance with these provisions would 
prevent the dellial of the application of 
the Geneva POW Convention to airmen, 
even whcn cOllvicted during hostilities 
of alleged war crimes. Un forLunatdy, 
most of the Communist bloc countries 
have enten!d resl!rvutions to arti(+ B5. 
The reservution of the North Korean 
Government is typical. They rcfUSI!d to 
IJ(~ bOllnd to providl! POW gtutus to 
individllals eonvidl'll IIndl'r Ilwal law of 
war 1: .. iIllI'S \IIull'r till' prilll'ipll''; of 
NurclIIlu'rg and the Tokyo F .. r E .. :;L 
I ntcrnational Military Tribunal. Tlu: 
(;overnnll:nt of China and tlw Norlh 
Vh!tnamcsc resl!rvations arc: similar. 
There lin: rmllly ellses of mistreatment 
of U.S. airmcn in the Korean conJlict, 
including the extortion of false germ-
warfare eonfl!ssions for propaganda pur-
poses and their public exposurl! to 
hostile crowds under humiliating cir-
cnmstllnees. Although all captured U.N. 
Forecs suffered to some extent under 
til(! fairly primitive conditions of COII-
finement which l:xisted, it was till: 
airman who was singled out espeeially 
for public degradation, exposun: to the 
pn's!', and the forcing of eonfl!ssiolls of 
iIIeglil conduct. 
TI\(! fate of all prisoners of war Iwld 
by till: North Vil!lnanH!SI! is of pn!!;cllt 
~mat (!Ollcern lu:e,l\Ise of tlw refusal f)f 
that Government to c<ln:"ilier tlH' 1l),~1) 
GI:I\l:Va Convention applicable to that 
conflict. Of interest to this diseul'..~ion, 
howl!ver, is the pllrticular light in which 
tlll:y consider cllptured U.S. airmen. t\ 
Hlinoi press reil!ase with 1I dlltcJilu! of I () 
.July 1%6 could well be e"<pected to 
rdlcet their official aLtitude on this 
i!'sue. A North Vil'lnamese lawYI:r writes 
that 1I.~. pilots .m' not pri:;olll'r:; of war 
but war ('rilllillals, that air raid:; on 
dl'Il::t:ly I'0pulah:d .rn:as iu South Vil'l-
nam lind Oil pllgodlls and hm;l'itah; in 
both the South and the North wen: 
l:ondueted by B-52 homiJl!rs lind lire 
concn:te war crimes under pnragraph 
(j(b) of the Nuremberg War Crimes 
Charter. HI: 1Iiso l'ites the bomhillg aud 
8trllfing of the dike system and othcr 
irriglltion works lind dl!nsdy populated 
cities such as Hanoi and HlIiphong liS 
war crimes. The North Vic:tnamesl: 
Iliwyer specifically refers to artide B of 
,the Nuremberg Chllrter lind stlltes thnt 
even though lIecused airmen have aeLed 
strictly on orders giv':ll by their govern-
nwnt or superiors, they remain indivirlu-
lilly responsibl(: for the air aLlm:kl'.. The 
lawy(:r ,vrill'S that tlw North V il'l Ila-
IlW~I' (~ovl'mllll'llt "d"lilll'rall'l" a lid 
('h'ar:;i~hlt'llly mit'll nllt (prnll'l,ti;)(\ for) 
tlmse pruseeut",1 Hlul ae('usI:d of war 
('rime~ mill erime~ a/!:ainst mankind" in 
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adhe:rinl!; to the Geneva Prisoner of War 
Convention. This i~ why, he concludes, 
U.S. pild1.s, who he lahcJs as pirates, 
saholeurs, and criminals, clin he tried, 
and presnmably punished, under the 
North Vietnmne::>c! law of 20 .J anullry 
195:1, which he "tiltes relates to crimes 
against the seeurity of North Vietnam. 
It WilS the unanimous opinion of the 
Secretllry GeJJt!ral and the [CRe experts 
that even where: airmcn had committed 
aets which were alleged to be war 
erimes, they shonld be trellted liS pris-
oners of war.3 2 I\lorcover, thilt iln air-
man behind t:ne:my linl's, in elistn:ss, ilnll 
not employillg any weapon should be 
protected fro\ll the civilian population. 
Ne'itllC'r, howev(!r, gave any significant 
attention to the relation of war crimes 
liS ddine:d at Nuremberg and Tokyo to 
the l'ondueL of air op,:rations. In view of 
the non prosecution of any Axis airman 
or o[ficilll for tlll!ir part in air lIetivities, 
~trategic homhing, which hy its nalure is 
hound to cause a great dc'al of su ffering 
ilnd devastation, must he judged on 
different grounds. Certainly the imper-
lIIi":;ihility of the' clt'fl'nt"l: of ~\'1J('rior 
orcic'r:; ha:; VC'!'), lllll,:;tionahlt, applil'ation 
to air eomhal. Tlw (!x perts mill tIll! 
Secretary Lolh raised this issue in lheir 
report by stating that when the attack 
of the military ohjl:t:tiv(: will eilu::t: 
serions loss to the t:iviliiln population 
.md is disproportionate to the militllry 
advantage, ain:rc:ws must mfrilin from 
tIll! allllek. In n:eommending thilt the 
principles in U.N. Resolu tion 2444 he 
introduced into army military instruc-
tion, cspccilllJy for air forces, the ex-
perts also stated this is "to remind all 
the members of the armed forces that it 
is sometimes their duty to give priority 
to the n:quirements of humllnity, 
placing these hefon! lIny eontrilry orders 
they mighl rc:ceive.,,3 3 
TI\(' airman might I'ropl'rly ask how 
he is to kIlOW, fly ill/!: off the' wing of his 
fIi~ht Il'ad.'r "t :IO,O(}O fed at night 0/' 
ovc:r a :;olicl ('ovl'ring of douds, whether 
the damage his bombs infliet will /IIeet 
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the te~t of proportionality or his 
bomhing will 1)(: indiserilllinat(~. Or if he 
does exereise hi~ individual judgllll:nL on 
a particular raid and rdrain~ from the 
attack by leaving the formation, whaL 
proof can he give wlj(~n a charge is 
brought by his own authorities for 
misbehavior before the enemy. IL would 
scem the prosecutors and judges who 
presided aL the war crimes trials in 
World War II took aetual air practice 
into account when they chose to refrain 
from the prosecution of Axis airmen or 
officials for their partieipation in "the 
conduct of air catnpaiv;ns. 
These thcn are three central dil(~m­
mas that impcde tl7e development of the 
laws of air warfare. All past dforts to 
define hy all-indusiv(~ enunwration 
those objeetives which are prop(~r mili-
tary targets have failed. Either they have 
been too restrictive or too indefinite to 
have bl'(!Il accorded rI1ueh n~speet by 
lwlligerents. General exhortations to re-
frain from t(~rror bombing, indiscrimi-
nate bombing, anll morah: bombing 
equally have a nebulom~ ring. TI}(~n: i~ 
no adt'lJuah~ standard to judg(, what 
('onstitu[(os this tyP(' of warfan', and no 
nation ha~ ('onsid('red that th('ir ('om· 
batan t air fon:(~s have ever resorted to 
the use of terror or indiscriminate at-
taeks. 
The 19:itl. I1al!u(' Convention for tlw 
protection of cultural property signals a 
. milestone by providing agreemen t for 
th(' n~ful!e of e(~rtain typt's of ohj('e(s 
and lllliidinv;s, Perhaps this concept ('an 
be enlarged to immuni",e other dearly 
defined resources and facilities of a 
b('lIig('f('nt nation. Comlllon eons(~nt for 
thl' exlI'nsion of hospital 11l1d safl'ly 
"'OlIt'S to l'over larger segments of th(, 
civilian population, n'moved from vital 
targct areas, also is a growinl! possihility. 
The dilt'mma of th!' choice of w('ap-
011 ill air olwratiolls is ('reat('d by til(' 
uneertain status of tl\(' IIS(' of 1IIl(''''ar 
fon'(~, tlw m'l' of incendiaries, inl'illding 
napalm, and tl\(' m;(' of mod('rn 111!('nts 
(jpsigned to eontrol tl\(' mov('nll'nt of 
Iwople-withou t prodll('ing signifie1mt 
harm-and to destroy plan ts, tre(:s, and 
food resolln:es hy dwmieal nwans. Till: 
applieahility of till: IlaV;lI(: H('V;lIlations 
and the Gcneva Gas Protocol to thes!: 
forms of waging war is far from settll:d 
anel unfortunately taints LllI: aircn:wman 
who is detail(:d to I'm ploy them. 
Finally, the statlls of the aircrewman, 
who all too f n'qlH:ntly s(!rves as the 
focal poinL of the opposing belligl:n:nt's 
indignation anel eharges that the laws of 
war have l)(~en violated, mllst Ill' re-
s[akd. It is the airman who is 1~~IH'dally 
vulnerable to mistn:atment and denial 
of his rights under the Geneva POW 
Convention of ] 949, because of Lhc 
inlH'rent destrudive enpaeity his mi!;sion 
may prodllee and Iwenlls\! III: hrinv;s tlw 
misforLulH' of war to the enemy hinter-
land. Clarification of the Nun:mberg 
principles as they apply to him, the 
airman, and withdrawal of reservations 
making possihh~ his treatment as a war 
criminal arc baelly needed. His legiti. 
matI' comhatant ~tatus mllst bl' reo 
affirnH'd. That neitlH'r the we:lIHl\1S 
pn'sl'rilwd for hi~ 11:'(' nor till' tmW:ts 
~..('I,lt'd for hi~ p'lrlil'lIlar mis~ion op· 
('ralt' 10 n'mo\'(' him from Ilw ranks of 
lawfnl eomhatants nlllsL hl' uniformly 
r('('ol!ni",('(1. With aV;f('I:mcnt on thes!' 
i~;:nt's, IIsdlll, pnt!'li('al instru!'lions [0 
aircrews on their duties and limitations 
and on their rights and expectations, 
under the laws or wl!r, more practicably 
follow. 
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